
Qmail
External Program
Submit bugs directly to this organization
In March 1997, I offered $500 to the first person to publish a verifiable security hole in the latest version of qmail: for example, a way for a user to exploit qmail to take over another account. My offer still stands. Nobody has found any security holes in qmail.
Of course, ``security hole in qmail'' does not include problems outside of qmail: for example, NFS security problems, TCP/IP security problems, DNS security problems, bugs in scripts run from .forward files, and operating system bugs generally. It's silly to blame a problem on qmail if the system was already vulnerable before qmail was installed! I also specifically disallowed denial-of-service attacks: they are present in every MTA, widely documented, and very hard to fix without a massive overhaul of several major protocols. (UNIX does offer some tools to prevent local denial-of-service attacks; see my resource exhaustion page for more information. See also my page responding to Wietse Venemas slander.)
A group of qmail users offered a $1000 prize for one year under similar rules. The prize was not claimed; the money was donated to the Free Software Foundation.
In May 2005, Georgi Guninski claimed that some potential 64-bit portability problems allowed a ``remote exploit in qmail-smtpd.'' This claim is denied. Nobody gives gigabytes of memory to each qmail-smtpd process, so there is no problem with qmail's assumption that allocated array lengths fit comfortably into 32 bits.